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ENEMIES THROUGH THE GATES: RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA CONFLICT
Noelle M. Shanahan Cutts
A good neighbor is a fellow who smiles at you over the back fence, but
doesn't climb over it.1
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Arthur “Bugs” Baer, in THE MODERN HANDBOOK OF HUOR, 345, 345 (Ralph L. Woods ed.,
1967).
2
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/georgia_republic.html (click on “Georgia (Small Map)
2006 (16K)”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Soviet successor states are ripe for conflict, especially ethnic conflict, as their citizens “struggle over the redistribution of power.”3 The 1991
disintegration of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation and the Soviet successor states resulted in numerous wars and ethnic conflicts, including those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.4
After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the Georgian
government sent troops to the ethnically non-Georgian provinces of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia “rather than consider[ing] their demand for federalization.”5 War broke out in both regions. In 1992, South Ossetia declared
itself independent from Georgia, intending to join North Ossetia to the Russian Republic.6 Ethnic Ossetians in South Ossetia established an “alternative
3
Kim Lane Scheppele, “We Forgot About the Ditches:” Russian Constitutional Impatience
and the Challenge of Terrorism, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 963, 1000 n.185 (2005). Some scholars
say that there is “the potential for some 200 inter-ethnic conflicts and other conflicts in the
former communist lands.” Terry McNeill, Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in
the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1997).
4
Scheppele, supra note 3. Nagorno-Karabakh is a de facto independent republic, officially
part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Trans-Dniester is a territory within the internationally
recognized boundaries of the Republic of Moldova. Tajikistan is a landlocked country in
Central Asia. Chechnya is a Russian republic located in the Northern Caucasus Mountains.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are both de facto independent regions of Georgia. Georgia (officially the Republic of Georgia from 1990–5) is situated in the South Caucasus between the
Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.
5
Alexander N. Domrin, From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism
in Post-Soviet Russia, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 519 (2006).
6
Tarik Abdel-Monem, Patrick J.D. Kennedy & Ekaterina Apostolova, R (On the Application of Al Skeini) v. Secretary of Defence: A Look at the United Kingdom’s Extraterritorial
Obligations in Iraq and Beyond, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 345, 352 n.48 (2005).
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government” and an alternative presidency in an attempt to break away
from Georgia.7
The war in Abkhazia, where the ethnic Abkhaz were a minority of
the total population, was a result of Russia’s military interference on the
side of the Abkhaz, which substantially improved Abkhazia’s bargaining
position.8 Accordingly, Abkhazia was able to declare de facto9 independence and set up its own government complete with a President, Parliament,
and cabinet.10 While South Ossetia and Abkhazia are de facto independent,
no other nation formally recognizes them,11 and the ethnic and political conflicts in those regions still endure after sixteen years.12 Grudgingly, both
remain de jure parts of Georgia.
Georgia blames Russia for the continuing Abkhazian conflict. Russia’s political, economic, and military support of the separatist government
in Abkhazia prompted the Georgian Parliament’s July 17, 2006 resolution,
“calling on the [Georgian] government to ‘start procedures . . . immediately
to suspend [Russia’s] so-called peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia’ . . . ,
claiming that they ‘represent one of the major obstacles on the way to solve
these conflicts peacefully.’”13 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, a
U.S.-educated lawyer, went even further, saying Abkhazia is “under a form
of gangster occupation which hopes the international community will lose
7

South Ossetia’s Other President, ARMENIAN NEWS BY A1+ ARMENIA, Feb. 10, 2007,
http://www.a1plus.am/en/?page=issue&iid=45392.
8
MONICA DUFFY TOFT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, INTERESTS, AND
THE INDIVISIBILITY OF TERRITORY 88 (2003).
9
De facto meaning “illegitimate but in effect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed.
2004).
10
E.K. Adzhindzhal, Abkhazia’s Liberation and International Law, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ABKHAZIA, http://www.abkhaziagov.org/en/Liberty.php (last
visited Oct. 29, 2007).
11
South Ossetia’s Other President, supra note 7; Bernhard Gwertzman, Sestanovich: Russia-Georgia Spat “Part of a Much Bigger Confrontation,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Oct.
4, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11602/sestanovich.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F3
348%2Fbernard_gwertzman%3Fgroupby%3D0%26hide%3D3348%26page%3D1%26id%3
D3348%26page%3D6.
12
While a discussion of whether or not Abkhazia and South Ossetia should, in fact, be recognized as independent nations is beyond the scope of this paper, scholars have suggested
the creation of “a federal system, with extensive powers devolved to autonomous regions”
saying that inspiration for such an arrangement can be drawn “from the experience of autonomous regions in other countries, such as Cata Ionia in Spain, South Tyrol in Italy, and
Greenland in Denmark.” David L. Phillips, Op-Ed., Power Sharing is the Way Forward for
Georgia, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at 15, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication
/6943/powersharing_is_the_way_forward_for_georgia.html.
13
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ABKHAZIA: WAYS FORWARD, EUROPE REPORT N°179 14 (2007),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/179_abkhazia
___ways_forward.pdf.
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interest and reward the results of ethnic cleansing.”14 He continued: “[t]he
painful, but factual truth is that these regions are being annexed to our
neighbor to the north—the Russian Federation has actively supported their
incorporation.”15 Georgia believes that Russia supports Abkhaz separatists
as part of a larger Russian plan aimed at curtailing Georgian sovereignty.16
Georgia insists that it is necessary to replace the U.N.-sanctioned Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS)17 peacekeeping force in Abkhazia,
comprised almost exclusively of Russian military, with another force that
will be more neutral, effective, and results-oriented.18
In spite of this, there are those who accuse Georgia of shifting the
blame to Russia for the continuing Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and the lack
of a peaceful resolution. International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization warns that “Georgians
and Abkhaz have been living in parallel realities that are drifting further
apart. . . . Unless they make a genuine effort to build on the progress that
there has been in a few areas, 2007 will be a dangerous year.”19 The two
views are as polarizing and confounding as the conflict itself. Nevertheless,
an examination of the facts makes it clear that Russia has violated international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict.
With the hope of providing an impartial analysis, this paper will address (1) how Russia’s “peacekeeping” and other activities in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict violate international law; (2) how these actions raise
questions about the credibility and efficacy of joint U.N. peacekeeping mis-

14
Michael Mainville, Proud Abkhazia Fiercely Resists Pull Into Georgia's Orbit, S. F.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 24, 2006, at A20.
15
Reuters AlertNet, Georgia Demands Removal of Russian “Peacekeepers,” REUTERS,
Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22174158.htm. Senator John
McCain has expressed concern that RF President Vladimir Putin is “trying to re-establish the
Russian empire.” William Mulgrew, McCain Talk Possible Presidential Bid, More In Philadelphia Visit, BULLETIN, Dec. 4, 2006, http://theeveningbulletin.com/.
16
Stephen Blank, Bracing for Conflict: Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia (A EurasiaNet
Commentary), EURASIANET.ORG, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/
insight/articles/eav092506a.shtml. Saakashvili cited Moscow’s support for separatists in
South Ossetia as part of the same Russian plan aimed at curtailing Georgian sovereignty. Id.
Notwithstanding this, a discussion of Russia’s involvement in the somewhat analogous South
Ossetia conflict is outside the boundaries of my discussion.
17
At present, the CIS unites Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. INT’L STAT.
COMM. OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEP. STATES, www.cisstat.com/eng/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2007).
18
Georgia considers replacing Russian peacekeepers with Ukrainians—Bezhuashvili,
INTERFAX, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11676369.
19
The Georgia/Abkhazia Conflict: Ways Forward, INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4619&1=1&m=1.
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sions; and (3) what recourse, legal or otherwise, Georgia may have against
Russia.
Part two briefly explains the historical context of the relationship
between the Russian Federation and Georgia. Part three explains the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and Russian involvement in peacekeeping missions,
and addresses the response of the international community including the
United Nations. Part four explores the relevant international law. Part five
describes how Russian violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict raise questions about the efficacy of U.N. joint peacekeeping missions and why the U.N. should create a framework for engaging
in joint peacekeeping missions with Russia. Part six examines Georgia’s
possibilities for action against Russia.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GEORGIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
Although the Republic of Georgia is a small nation of approximately five million people,20 its location between the Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey blesses (or curses) it with strategic importance
far beyond its size.21 Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze22
often said that Georgia is “the tastiest morsel of the former Soviet Union
and the Russians want it back.”23
During the seventy years of Soviet occupation that began in March
1921 when Georgia became part of the Soviet Union,24 “the Georgians
maintained their unique alphabet and their particular interpretation of the
Christian orthodox religion.”25 While not the case in many countries, Geor20
United States Central Intelligence Agency—The World Factbook—Georgia, Sept. 20,
2007, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gg.html (last visited Oct. 07, 2007)
[hereinafter CIA].
21
U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Geor.,
Sept. 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm [hereinafter Dept. of State]. With a
total area of approximately 69,700 sq. kilometers, Georgia is slightly smaller than the state of
South Carolina. CIA, supra note 20. Russian interests in Georgia include: strategic borders,
Black Sea access, land routes, economic interests, and military garrisons. See John Mackinlay & Evgenii Sharov, Russian Peacekeeping Operations in Georgia, in REGIONAL
PEACEKEEPERS: THE PARADOX OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING, 69–70 (John Mackinlay & Peter
Cross eds., 2003).
22
Shevardnadze served as President of Georgia from 1995 until he resigned on Nov. 23,
2003 in response to Georgia’s Rose Revolution. Prior to his presidency, he served under
Mikhail Gorbachev as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from 1985 to
1990. Shevardnadze, Eduard, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2007) available at
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9067333. Georgia, in BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR, 2005
available at http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9398338.
23
Gwertzman, supra note 11.
24
Dept. of State, supra note 21.
25
Mackinlay & Sharov, supra note 21, at 64.
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gia considered the Russian occupation “not so much a traumatizing cultural
and political subordination as a continuation of an existing relationship of a
protectorate state and its imperial master,”26 considering the fact that “[a]s
early as 1773, Georgia acceded to the need for protection within the Russian
Empire as an annexed state. . . .”27 However, during the occupation, the
Soviet Union recognized “unique ethnic communities in Georgia, the South
Ossetians [and] the Abkhazians, as ‘titular nations.’”28 Russia’s recognition
of these communities foreshadowed the Georgia/South Ossetia and Georgia/Abkhazia ethnic conflicts that continue today.29
Russian interest in the region remained strong during the disintegration of the Soviet Union.30 After the Supreme Council for the Republic of
Georgia declared independence in April 199131—and during the ethnic conflicts that followed32—Russia sought a continued physical presence in
Georgia that would allow it to maintain strategic borders,33 access the Black
Sea34 and important land routes,35 pursue economic interests, and leave military garrisons in place.36 Somewhat alarmingly, and allegedly because of
these interests, Russian officials have tried to establish the Kosovo conflict37
as a precedent that would motivate the international community to endorse
26

Id.
Id.
28
Id. at 65.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 68.
31
Dept. of State, supra note 21.
32
Mackinlay & Sharov, supra note 21, at 68.
33
Id. at 69.
34
Id. “After [Georgia declared independence in] 1991, Russia’s ability to control its strategic and economic interests in the Black Sea region were greatly diminished through both the
geographic reductions in access to the Black Sea and the splitting of the Black Sea fleet.
Russia’s presence in Abkhazia and the controlling instruments provided by the Russian garrison significantly increased their access beyond their internationally recognized Black Sea
frontage.” Id.
35
Id. Access to land routes is extremely important; such access enables Russia to move large
amounts of military logistics by road and rail. Id.
36
Id. at 70.
37
Elena Guskova, a Russian academic and an expert on Balkans said it was too early to say
what the Russian position on Kosovo might ultimately be. On one hand, Kosovo's independence would grant the same rights to the people of Abkhazia. On the other hand, Kosovo’s
independence could boost separatist movements in Russian republics such as Chechnya.
Kosovo: Possible Russian U.N. Veto of Independence Buoys Serbia, ADNKRONOS INT’L, Sept.
12, 2006, available at http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2006/September_13/1.html.
Accordingly, Russia has expressed some concern about “Kosovo’s separatist aspirations.”
Report: Serbia Counting on Russian, Chinese Veto to Block Kosovo Independence, Official
Says, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/12/
europe/EU-GEN-Serbia-Kosovo.php.
27
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the breakaway efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, paving the way for a
Russian land grab, or at least the creation of smaller nations more willing to
“work” with Russia.38
More recently, Russia has viewed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (the BTC winds its way through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia),
a major route for delivery of oil from Kazakhstan to Europe,39 as a serious
effort by the West to pry Georgia and all of Central Asia from Russia’s
sphere of influence.40 Even the United States is worried that Russia has allowed its interests to get in the way of a peaceful resolution to the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict. The nonprofit Council on Foreign Relations advised
President Bush in a policy paper:
There is nothing legitimate about [Russia] limiting the opportunity of its
neighbors [e.g., Georgia] to deepen their integration into the international
economy, to choose security allies and partners, or to pursue democratic
political transformation.41

Notably, the United States has strong interests in Georgia as well;
therefore, its criticisms of Russia should be viewed accordingly. U.S. President George W. Bush has listed Georgia as an international terrorism target.42 In 2002, the U.S. military entered Georgia for limited missions when
pro-independence Chechen troops infiltrated the Pankisi Gorge.43 In January
2007, Georgian authorities and the CIA detained a Russian man who tried to
sell weapons-grade uranium to undercover agents.44 In March 2007, Geor38

See Stephen Blank, Bracing for Conflict: Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia (A EurasiaNet Commentary), EURASIANET.ORG, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insight/articles/eav092506a.shtml.
39
See Catherine Dale, The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia), in PEACEKEEPING AND THE ROLE OF
RUSS. IN EURASIA 121, 124 (Lena Jonson & Clive Archer eds., 1995).
40
M. Ismail Khan, The Trans-Karakoram Oil Pipeline, THE NEWS, http://www.thenews.
com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=30039 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). “According to an assessment
by U.S. Department of Energy, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan alone sit on more than 130 billion barrel oil, three times more than the United State's own reserves. Being a country where
four per cent of the world’s population consumes about one-fourth of global energy output, it
is but natural for the U.S. to keep a good calculation of the world’s oil wells. Besides, given
the fast rate of resource depletion, and the chronic political uncertainties the Middle East
continues to suffer, it is only prudent for the world to look for oil in remote places like the
Caspian.” Id.
41
Robert McMahon, Russia Sanctions Georgia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Oct. 4, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11566/russian_storm_clouds_over_georgia.html.
42
Jaba Devdariani, Georgia on a Fault Line, 8 ISCIP-PERSPECTIVE (2002), http://www.bu.
edu/iscip/vol13/Devdariani2.html.
43
Associated Press, Green Berets Land in Georgia for 2-Year Training Program, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2002, at A2.
44
See Moscow Lashes Out at Georgia at Uranium Sale Plot Thickens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2007, at A4.
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gia announced that it would raise the number of its soldiers serving with the
U.S.-led coalition in Iraq to more than 2,000. Georgia hopes that its willingness to help in Iraq sends a strong message to NATO that it is ready to join
the organization. Russia says that allowing Georgia to join NATO would
seriously affect Russian security interests,45 saying that Georgia’s membership in NATO could upset fragile stability in the Caucasus and hurt Russia's
interests.46 Russia fears that Georgia’s NATO membership will create a
slippery slope culminating in the entire region’s NATO membership.
The United States and Georgia both have something to gain from
close relations. Accordingly, Russia and the United States are engaged in a
“soft power” duel in Georgia, “from economic and market influence, to
democracy support and denial, to aggressive diplomacy—to create a region
in their own image.”47 Nevertheless, Russia’s desire to create a region in its
own image is no excuse for its violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA CONFLICT
Abkhazia had the dubious honor of being the “playground of the
Soviet elite” before the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.48 Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev had luxurious summer residences along its Black Sea
shores, and Soviet vacationers crowded its beaches, bringing with them
their rubles and Soviet influences.49 Many locals like to say that when Cuban President Fidel Castro met Khrushchev in Abkhazia, he raved that its
beauty matched that of his homeland.50 Abkhazia remained an independent
Soviet Socialist Republic until 1931, when it became an autonomous republic of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.51 It remained so during the
Cold War. As the Soviet Union began to unravel, tension developed between Georgia and Abkhazia as the Abkhaz people began demanding the
restoration of the region’s pre-1931 status and a return to what they viewed
as the normalcy of autonomy.52
45

Paul Taylor, Georgia Demands Removal of Russian “Peacekeepers,” REUTERS, Sept. 22,
2006, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N22174158.
46
Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, Provinces Spark War of Words, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept.
26, 2006, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=18953.
47
McMahon, supra note 41.
48
Michael Mainville, Proud Abkhazia Fiercely Resists Pull into Georgia's Orbit, S. F.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 24, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/
archive/2006/09/24/MNGSSLBNK81.DTL&type=politics.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Dept. of State, Fact Sheet: The Abkhazia Conflict, July 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/
p/eur/rls/fs/53745.htm [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
52
Id.
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Abkhazia won de facto independence from Georgia in a 1992–1993
war. During the war, both Georgia and Abkhazia:
53

[S]howed reckless disregard for the protection of the civilian population,
and [were] responsible for gross violations of international humanitarian
law . . . Combatants both deliberately targeted and indiscriminately attacked civilians and civilian structures, killing hundreds of civilians
through bombing, shelling and rocket attacks. Combatants deployed and
used major weapons in civilian areas, recklessly endangering peaceful residents by situating legitimate military targets close to their homes. They
also used weapons like the Grad rocket, although these were notoriously
inaccurate. Troops on the ground terrorized the local population through
house-to-house searches, and engaged in widespread looting and pillage
[sic], stripping civilians of property and food.54

Georgia and Abkhazia negotiated several cease-fire agreements; but
one or both sides would eventually breach the cease-fire, making it necessary for the sides to negotiate a new agreement.55 When the July 1993
cease-fire negotiated between Georgia and Abkhazia broke down, the Russian foreign ministry pressured Georgia and Abkhazia into negotiating
another one. Notwithstanding this, “the Russian general staff had decided
that the only way to resolve the conflict would be to remove all Georgian
military forces from Abkhazia, and the Russian military mounted a surprise
attack supporting the Abkhaz forces in taking Sukhumi and other lands.”56
At this time, President Shevardnadze “had to accept CIS membership and
give permission for Russian forces to be stationed in Georgia.”57 It was a
compromise that resounds to this day.
Things proceeded swiftly from there. In August 1993, the United
Nations established the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
comprised of eighty-eight military observers to monitor compliance with the
most recent cease-fire agreement.58 On March 24, 1994, the U.N. General
Assembly granted observer status to the CIS forces already in the region.59
53

Evelyn Leopold, US, UK Object to Russia’s U.N. Proposal on Georgia, REUTERS, Sept.
30, 2006, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N30263437.
54
Human Rights Watch, Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s
Role in the Conflict, 7 HUM. RTS. WATCH ARMS PROJECT 1, 5 (Mar. 1995), http://www.hrw.
org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia953.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Watch].
55
There were three ceasefires: September 3, 1992; July 28, 1993; and May 14, 1994. Unofficial Background Report, Peace and Sec. Section, Geor.—UNOMIG Background (2002),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomigB.htm.
56
McNeill, supra note 3, at 102.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 103; S.C. Res. 858 para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/858 (Aug. 24, 1993). Following the
May 1994 ceasefire agreement, the Security Council authorized the increase in UNOMIG’s
strength to up to 136 military observers. S.C. Res. 937, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/937 (July
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On April 4, 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Declaration of
Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, and
committed themselves to strict observance of a cease-fire and to cooperate
to ensure the safe, secure, and dignified return of people who had fled the
area.60 A demilitarized security zone was created on either side of the Inguri
River on May 14, 1994, when both sides signed the Agreement on a CeaseFire and Separation of Forces.61 The CIS62 deployed a 2,000-member
peacekeeping force, comprised exclusively of Russian military, to this zone
to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.63 The Russian peacekeeper’s mandate said:
The function of the [peacekeeping] force of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall be to exert its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire
and to see that it is scrupulously observed. Further, its presence should
promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially to the
Gali region. It shall supervise the implementation of the Agreement and
the Protocol thereto with regard to the security zone and the restrictedweapons zone. In carrying out its mission, the force shall comply with local laws and regulations and shall not impede the functioning of the local
civil administration. It shall enjoy freedom of movement in the security
zone and the restricted-weapons zone and freedom of communications,
and other facilities needed to fulfill its mission.64

That the CIS sanctioned this peacekeeping mission gave it the appearance of legitimacy and something other than what it actually was: a
purely unilateral Russian action devoid of any real U.N. influence.65 Within
the CIS, however, there is a huge discrepancy between its stated principles66

21, 1994). Approximately nine years later, the Security Council authorized the addition of “a
U.N. police component of 20 officers.” S.C. Res. 1494, para. 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1494
(July 30, 2003).
59
McNeill, supra note 3, at 103.
60
Fact Sheet, supra note 51. The agreement was signed in Moscow. Id.
61
Id. The agreement was signed in Moscow as well. Id.
62
At present, the CIS unites Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. INT’L STAT.
COMM. OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEP. STATES, supra note 17.
63
See Fact Sheet, supra note 51.
64
Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, Geor.-Abkhaz, Apr. 4, 1994, available at http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/geo1.pdf.
65
In this and other conflicts, Russia “intervened both openly and covertly in the international affairs of its ex-republics, ostensibly for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes, and has
repeatedly sought international sanction via the U.N., OSCE, and CIS for its actions.”
McNeill, supra note 3, at 97.
66
The principles and purposes of the CIS are outlined in Articles I and II of the Charter of
the Commonwealth of Independent States. The CIS “is based on the foundations of the
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and the activities of Russia, its key member, which has continually flouted
almost all of the CIS’s principles.67 The UNOMIG and CIS forces have
parallel mandates, but the forces are independent from one another.68
A consensus emerged within Russia about its interests in the CIS
space around the same time that the CIS deployed its peacekeeping force;
Russia, as a regional superpower, believed it had a “special responsibility”
to ensure order in the region.69 Russia believed it had a right and responsibility to act as peacekeeper in the “near abroad” because:
(1) Russia as the successor to the former Soviet Union has a special role to
play in the region which it traditionally has ruled; (2) the territory of the
former Soviet Union is a geostrategic space in which Russia has special interests; (3) Russia has special responsibility for the security and well-being
of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speaking communities
throughout the CIS; and (4) Russia as a great power has both regional and
global responsibilities.70

Inevitably, problems arose as Russia’s idea of peacekeeping drastically departed from U.N. peacekeeping norms.71 Russian “peacekeeping”
practice did not meet international standards; unlike the traditional approach
of acting as impartial umpire between competing sides, Russian “peacekeeequality of all of its members. The member states are independent and equal subjects of
international law. The Commonwealth serves the further development and strengthening of
relations of friendship, good neighborhood, international harmony, trust, mutual understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation between member states. The Commonwealth is not a
state and does not hold supranational powers.” CIS Charter, sec. I, art.1, Dec. 1991. Furthermore, the CIS’s purposes are as follows: “The realization of cooperation in political, economic, environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other spheres; universal and balanced
economic and social development of member states under the framework of common economic space, interstate cooperation and integration; ensuring human rights and fundamental
liberties in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law
and documents of the CSCE; cooperation between member states to ensure international
peace and security, the realization of effective measures for the reduction of arms and military expenditures, the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction,
and the achievement of universal and full disarmament; assisting citizens of member states in
free interaction, contacts and movement in the Commonwealth; mutual legal assistance and
cooperation in other spheres of legal relations; peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts
between states of the Commonwealth.” Id. at art. 2.
67
McNeill, supra note 3, at 98. Russia “has flouted almost all of the CIS’s principles in its
bid to retrieve former economic, military and political hegemony over the former USSR.” Id.
68
Monthly Forecast, January 2006, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., Dec. 23, 2005,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SCR_ForecastJan06_Typeset.doc.
69
See DOV LYNCH, RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING STRATEGIES IN THE CIS: THE CASES OF
MOLDOVA, GEORGIA AND TAJIKISTAN 9 (2000).
70
McNeill, supra note 3, at 101.
71
Id. at 98.
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pers” are inserted to support one side over another72 and to “operate without
a clear mandate, withdrawal timetable, or rules of engagement.”73 This has
led to Russian “peacekeeping” being aptly described as “coercive diplomacy.”74
Russian peacekeepers did allow “the safe return of refugees and
displaced persons[,]”75 and by 1998 tens of thousands of internally displaced persons returned to their former homes, but escalating hostilities that
same year culminated in a large-scale Abkhaz sweep operation, where at
least 1,500 Georgian homes were reduced to ashes and at least 40,000
Georgians were re-expelled. The U.N. Security Council (Security Council)
condemned “the deliberate destruction of houses by Abkhaz forces, with the
apparent motive of expelling people from their home areas.”76
Thousands died because of the war and it forced at least 300,000
ethnic Georgians from the region.77 Throughout the conflict, the Security
Council issued resolutions “condemn[ing] any attempts to change the demographic compilation of Abkhazia”78 in response to the vast changes in
ethnic makeup caused by the conflict. Before the conflict began in 1992,
Abkhaz represented around eighteen percent of the population in Abkhazia,
and Georgians represented about fifty percent of the population.79 Georgia’s
permanent representative to the United Nations says that genocide and ethnic cleansing took place during and after the 1992–1993 war with the result
that today there are almost no ethnic Georgians left in Abkhazia.80
As the ethnic majority after the conflict, the resident Abkhaz set up
their own government, complete with a president, parliament, and cabinet.81
Nevertheless, the Abkhaz victory has been purely Pyrrhic; no country in the
72

Lynch, supra note 69, at 19–20, 24. For example, Russian support during the NagornoKarabakh war remained officially neutral; however, both sides (Armenia and Azerbaijan)
accused the Russian military of favoritism. Russia, in fact, provided support to Armenia. No
Military Partnership with Azerbaijan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A26.
73
See generally Lynch, supra note 69. The Russian military is unfamiliar with peacekeeping
and regards it as a form of combat or a “war-fighting tool.” Id. at 100–01.
74
See id. at 25–28.
75
Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, supra note 64.
76
S.C. Res. 1187, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1187 (July 30, 1998).
77
S.C. Res. 896, U.N. Doc. S/RES/896 (Jan. 31, 1994).
78
Id. at para. 12.
79
Press Conference, Dept. of Pub. Info., Press Conference by Georgia (Jan.2, 2006),
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060201_Georgia.doc.htm [hereinafter Press
Conference].
80
Id. According to Georgia’s permanent representative to the U.N., “[t]he ethnic cleansing
that occurred there had been confirmed by the international community, and reflected in
resolutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the
1990s.” Id.
81
Adzhindzhal, supra note 9.
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world officially recognizes Abkhazia.82 To ameliorate this, Abkhazia has
begun to lobby for regional recognition, starting with its closest ally. In October 2006—amid rising tensions between Russia and Georgia—Abkhazian
“President” Sergei Bagapash, with the support of the Abkhaz “Parliament,”
called on the Russian Federation to recognize Abkhazia’s independence,
strengthening its campaign for international recognition. 83 In December
2006, Abkhazia held a “national gathering” to “show its determination to
gain full independence” from Georgia.84 Russia, however, has shown no
sign of formally recognizing Abkhazia. It continues to address Abkhazia’s
legal status in accordance with the principle of the territorial integrity of
Georgia.
Nevertheless, Russia’s actions belie an ulterior motive. While Russia officially supports the territorial integrity of Georgia, what has taken
place in Abkhazia is fundamentally different. In fact, it appears that Russia
is engaged in a unique form of nation building. Trade in Abkhazia is conducted in Russian rubles and the Abkhazian economy is tied to the Russian
economy.85 Russia provides Abkhazia with practical support in the form of
pensions and railway infrastructure.86 Russia has also provided Russian
passports to a large number of Abkhazian citizens.87 Russian tourists flock
to Abkhazia’s Black Sea beaches to the point that in 2005 income from
tourism helped double the local budget to $35 million.88 Georgia accuses
Russian banks in Abkhazia of money laundering.89

82
Russia-Georgia: No Compromise on Army Bases Yet, RIA NOVOSTI, May 17, 2005,
http://en.rian.ru/world/20050517/40370700.html.
83
Anzhela Kuchuberia, Bagapsh Calls on Russia to Recognize its Independence, ITAR-TASS,
Oct. 18, 2006. Bagapsh said, “the [R]epublic should address the President of Russia and the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to recognize independence of the Republic of
Abkhazia and establish associated relations between Russia and Abkhazia.” Id.; see also The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/15 (Jan. 11, 2007).
84
Abkhazia to Hold ‘National Gathering’ for Independence, RIA NOVOTSI , June 12, 2006,
http://en.rian.ru/world/20061206/56527550-print.html.
85
Alisa Voznaya, Looking to Chechnya for Answers: How Abkhazia and Georgia Can
Learn from Russian Lessons, BALKAN ANALYSIS, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.balkanalysis.
com/2006/08/29/looking-to-chechnya-for-answers-how-abkhazia-and-georgia-can-learnfrom-russian-lessons/.
86
Id.; Bruno Coppieters, The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, J. ON ETHNOPOLITICS AND
MINORITY ISSUES IN EUROPE, ch. 5, § 2 (2004), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/
download/1-2004Chapter5.pdf.
87
Id. Russia was in the process of issuing Russian passports to Abkhazians in 2003. Id.
88
Mainville, supra note 14.
89
Press Conference, supra note 79; see also Michael Schwirtz, Criminal Gang Controlling
Russian Banks is Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/10/18/world/europe/18russiansumm.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
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Russia claims to act only as an arbitrator between the two factions,
yet its territorial interests are exposed through both the amount of assistance
its “peacekeepers” gave Abkhazia during the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and
the support it continues to provide to Abkhazia today.90 Georgia, meanwhile, attempts to distance itself politically and ideologically from Russia
while keeping its piecemeal country intact and independent.
IV. RUSSIA’S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.

Peacekeepers Unauthorized to Provide Weapons or to Take Military
Action

Peacekeepers are not authorized to provide military, financial, or
logistical support to one side in a conflict,91 or to take military action against
a party to the conflict.92 Furthermore, it is a violation of international law to
provide training and military support to one side to an internal conflict, especially when that support comes from a peacekeeping force within the
country.93
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, in accordance with the
U.N. Charter, provides that:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force.94

The Declaration further provides that “no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.”95 In Nicaragua v. United States of
America, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made it clear that the prin90

Voznaya, supra note 85.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 116, 101 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities], available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2007). On December 19, 2006, the
International Court of Justice held that Uganda violated Congo’s sovereignty by invading it,
occupying territory in Ituri, and providing military, financial, and logistical support to antiKabila Congolese rebels within the country between 1998 and 2002. Id.
92
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 307–08 (4th ed. 2005).
93
Armed Activities, supra note 91, at 56.
94
G.A. Res. 2625 at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25 Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24,
1970).
95
Id.
91
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ciple of non-intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in
another State.”96 In Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ noted that acts which breach
the principle of non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly
involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of
force in international relations.”97 “These provisions are declaratory of customary international law.”98
Russia says it is an independent broker fielding peacekeeping missions and its representatives have publicly said they recognize the territorial
integrity of Georgia.99 The Georgian Parliament contends, however, that
Russia was “directly involved in the initiation of conflicts in Abkhazia . . .
in [the] early 90s, first through an intensive delivery of arms to conflicting
sides, and later through direct participation of its military personnel serving
in Gudauta military base in military actions against Georgia.”100 In fact,
Security Council Resolution 876 “calls on all states to prevent the provision
from their territories or by persons under their jurisdiction of all assistance .
. . to the Abkhaz side and in particular to prevent the supply of any weapons
and munitions.”101 This raises the question of whether any state or other
entity was providing weapons to either side.
Human Rights Watch concluded that the “sudden presence of armor, tanks, and heavy artillery among the previously lightly armed Abkhaz
in the fighting between October and December 1992 realistically leaves
little room for any conclusion except that some parties, within the Russian
forces, decided to supply the Abkhaz.”102 Russia escalated human rights
abuses by making “available weapons to groups or individuals known or
likely to use them to commit atrocities.”103 Russia’s provision of weapons to
the Abkhaz was in violation of international law. Furthermore, Russia intervened in armed conflict within Georgia.
The Abkhaz, with the assistance of Russian military vessels and logistics, launched three major assaults on Sukhumi in which there were a
number of civilian deaths.104 Some Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory; there were also a variety of freelance figh96

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27, 1986).
Armed Activities, supra note 91, at 56.
98
Id.
99
McMahon, supra note 41.
100
Parliament of Georgia, Some Facts of Russian Policy Towards Georgia,
http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=63&info_id=13323 (last visited
Oct. 29, 2007).
101
S.C. Res. 876, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/876 (Oct. 19, 1993).
102
Human Rights Watch, supra note 54, at 32.
103
Id. at 6.
104
Id. at 7.
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ters, including Cossacks.105 Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch determined
that “Russian government officials . . . sanctioned the sending of Russian
fighters to Abkhazia as agents of the Russian Federation.”106 Therefore,
Russia intervened in support of an internal opposition within a state. Under
Nicaragua and Congo, Russia’s intervention on behalf of the Abkhaz violates international law.
B.

Civilians are Unlawful Targets

The Geneva Conventions apply to armed conflicts that are international in nature. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia held that “an armed conflict exists whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups in a State.”107 Furthermore, an armed conflict within a State’s
borders is international if “the troops of another State intervene in the conflict and even where some participants in the internal armed conflict act on
behalf of this other State.”108
For the purposes of international humanitarian law, a person is a civilian if he or she is not a member of the armed forces.109 The parties to a
conflict have the duty to protect and respect civilians pursuant to customary
international law.110 This concept is also codified in Geneva Convention IV,
Article 27, paragraph 1.
Furthermore, it is customary international law that “the conduct of
any organ of a State . . . be regarded as an act of that State.”111 War crimes
cover even “isolated acts committed by individual soldiers acting without
direction or guidance from higher up.”112 For example, the ICJ held in Congo v. Uganda that the conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) was the conduct of a State organ.113 The court said that by virtue of their military status, the UPDF’s
105

Id. at 7.
Id. at 52.
107
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
108
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 59
(2nd ed. 2004).
109
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 210 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
2003).
110
See id. at 502.
111
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29).
112
Schabas, supra note 108, at 55.
113
Armed Activities, supra note 91, para. 213.
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conduct was attributable to Uganda.114 The Court did not accept Uganda’s
argument that those individuals within the UPDF “did not act in the capacity of persons exercising governmental authority in the particular circumstances.”115 It is customary international law that a party to an armed conflict
shall be responsible for all acts by persons forming part of its armed forces.
This is reflected in Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907116 and in Article 91 of Protocol
I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.117
Early Security Council resolutions regarding the Georgia/Abkhazia
conflict referred to Russia as a “facilitator of peace.” Yet, Russian soldiers
“carried out a large number of attacks against Georgian targets, which resulted in civilian casualties.”118 Russian planes attacked Sukhumi on February 20, 1993, followed by other air raids.119 While the Russian defense ministry contended that the “Georgians are bombing themselves,” the evidence
strongly indicates that the attacks were carried out by Russian forces.120 In
fact, Georgian forces succeeded in downing an SU-27 fighter-bomber that
was raiding Sukhumi on March 19, 1993. Upon inspection, a U.N. military
observer confirmed that the aircraft was Russian and the pilot was a major
in the Russian air force.121
Because Russia intervened in the conflict and at least some Russians acted on behalf of Abkhazia, the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict is international in nature. Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions apply. Russia should
be held responsible for the actions of individual active-duty members of
Russia’s armed or security forces in Abkhazia. Pursuant to international
law, Russia is responsible for its peacekeeping forces’ slaughter of Georgian
civilians.
Coming to its own defense, Russia professes to play a humanitarian
and pacifying role, saying that if Russian peacekeepers were “not present,
114

Id.
Id.
116
“A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed
by persons forming part of its armed forces.” The Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land ch. 1, art. 3, October 18, 1907, 1 Malloy 2269.
117
“A Party to the conflict . . . shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 45.
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Human Rights Watch, supra note 54, at 6.
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Id. at 37.
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the Abkhaz would be doomed.”122 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
contends that the peacekeepers are “the principal restraining force in the
region.”123 While it is arguable that peacekeepers are necessary to prevent
the Georgians or Abkhaz from committing atrocities, Russian peacekeepers
have engaged in the conflict and murdered civilians—hardly the ideal role
for facilitators of peace. Protecting the Abkhaz does not give Russian
peacekeepers carte blanch to launch attacks against Georgian civilians who
are not themselves engaged in the conflict. In fact, Russian peacekeepers are
meant to prevent the escalation of the conflict and to protect Georgians and
Abkhaz alike.124
C.

Russia Violated Georgia’s Sovereignty

Pursuant to international law, a state has “sovereignty over its territory.”125 The development of a system of sovereign states culminated at the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and conceptions of a modern sovereign state
were introduced into the political realm by the writings of Machiavelli,
Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes. 126 While some scholars doubt whether a stable
notion of sovereignty exists, there is a definition of what sovereignty came
to mean in early modern Europe, of which most subsequent definitions are a
variant: supreme authority within a territory.127 Black’s Law Dictionary
adopts the ‘Westphalian Model’ of sovereignty, defining it as “supreme
dominion, authority, or rule.” This model, also recognized by the United
Nations in its Charter,128 asserts that all sovereigns are equal and exercise
power within their own territory.129 The U.N. Charter recognizes a sovereign state’s right “to regulate its territory and nationals.” While a nation’s
right to sovereignty is not without its limits, sovereignty is of paramount
concern in international law.

122
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ABKHAZIA TODAY, EUR. REPORT N°176 7 (2006),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/176_abkhazia_today.pdf.
123
Id.
124
Recall the April 4, 1994, Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces which said
that the Russian peacekeepers were there in order to maintain the ceasefire. See Agreement
on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, supra note 64.
125
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 206 (1987).
126
Dan Philpott, Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/.
127
Id.
128
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
129
See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (2005).
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In Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ held that “the unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration” that it was a
grave violation of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition of force.130 While Russian
peacekeepers intervened in Georgia with the consent of Georgian officials,
and were subsequently endorsed by the Security Council as members of a
joint peacekeeping mission, the intervention has lasted more than thirteen
years. The results of Russian action have been devastating, with Russian
peacekeepers responsible for a number of civilian deaths. Accordingly, Russia’s actions constitute an excessive use of force and a violation of Georgia’s right to sovereignty. Furthermore, in Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ held:
If a State assumes an obligation in an international agreement to respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other States parties to that
agreement . . . and a commitment to co-operate with them in order to fulfill
such obligation, this expresses a clear legally binding undertaking that it
will not repeat any wrongful acts.131

Russia officially respects the territorial integrity of Georgia; the Security Council, of which Russia is a permanent member, respects the territorial integrity of Georgia. Security Council resolutions are binding on U.N.
Member States. Accordingly, Russia is legally obligated to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia’s disrespect for the territorial integrity of
Georgia subsequent to such Security Council resolutions just adds fuel to
the fire. Russia’s behavior in this context is little different than a schoolyard
bully that believes it, as the regional superpower, may act in any manner it
deems desirable, despite international law to the contrary.
D. Provision of Russian Passports
The issuance of Russian passports to seventy to ninety percent of
Abkhazians (otherwise Georgian citizens) since 2003 gives the impression
that Abkhazia is a Russian protectorate. 132 Georgian officials say that this
cannot be viewed as anything but an attempt to annex Abkhazia.133 They
also ask two important questions: (1) “can Russia be an unbiased facilitator
130

Armed Activities, supra note 91, at para. 165.
Id. at para. 257.
132
Georgia Update, EUROPEAN FORUM, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.europeanforum.net/
coun.try/georgia; Tom Parfitt, Georgia Up in Arms Over Olympic Clash, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2143104,00.html.
Abkhazians rushed to acquire Russian passports before citizenship regulations tightened in
2002. Abkhaz Rush for Russian Passports, INST. OF WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, June 27,
2002, http://iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=160553&apc_state=henicrs2002.
133
Georgia's Key Foreign Policy Challenges (CSIS Georgia Forum Notes), EMBASSY OF
GEORGIA, Dec. 4, 2002, http://www.georgiaemb.org/DisplayDoc.asp?id=77; see also INT’L
CRISIS GROUP, supra note 13, at 5.
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in the [Georgia/Abkhazia] conflict if a majority of the residents of [the Abkhazian] side are Russian citizens?” and (2) will there ever be a situation
where Russia will justify greater involvement in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict as necessary to protect its citizens?134 While it is the Russian government and not the Russian peacekeepers issuing Russian passports, the Russian government’s decision to issue passports to the Abkhaz clearly demonstrates its bias in the conflict.
Abkhaz law allows dual Russian-Abkhaz citizenship but not dual
Georgian-Abkhaz citizenship Black’s Law Dictionary describes a passport
as “a formal document certifying a person’s identity and citizenship so that
the person may travel to and from a foreign country.” While the issue of an
authentic passport (there is a large market for counterfeit.135 Russian passport holders are entitled to Russian pensions of about fifty dollars a
month136 and social security payments—both considerably higher than in
Georgia. 137 In addition, many Abkhaz engage in small-scale smuggling to
Russia and find a Russian passport necessary to their business.138 Ethnic
Georgians living in Abkhazia must obtain Russian passports if they wish to
travel abroad, vote, or participate in the political process.139 Georgian passport holders are denied Russian visas,140 and most travelers wishing to enter
Russia from Georgia without a Russian passport must do so via a third
country.141
Black’s Law Dictionary describes a passport as “a formal document
certifying a person’s identity and citizenship so that the person may travel to
and from a foreign country.” While the issue of an authentic passport (there
is a large market for counterfeit passports) “raises no more than a presumption that the holder is a national of the state of issue, [] the presumption is
not easily rebutted.”142 Some scholars posit that a passport is, in fact, evi134
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dence of nationality.143 A passport entitles the holder to the protection and
assistance of the holder’s diplomatic and consular officers abroad.144 Members of the Russian Duma make frequent statements emphasizing that ethnic
Abkhaz with Russian passports are their citizens;145 as Russian citizens,
they are entitled to Russia’s protection as stipulated in the Russian Federation Constitution.146 In July 2006, the Russian Duma passed a resolution
authorizing Russian troops to serve anywhere in the defense of Russian citizens—presumably including those who reside permanently in Abkhazia.147
The chairperson of the State Duma International Affairs Committee said
that Russia would use “all means at [Russia’s] disposal” to protect Russian
passport holders in Abkhazia, including the military in extreme cases.148
While a country is free to establish its own rules and regulations regarding
passports, Russia’s claim that it is justified in protecting all Russian passport holders raises serious questions of international law.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits Members from using
force against other nations, subject to two exceptions. First, Members may
use force when the Security Council authorizes a Member to use force
against another. Second, Members are able to act in self-defense against an
armed attack. The Charter states: “[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Although the text of
U.N. Charter Article 51 does not appear to allow the use of force until
another nation physically launches its attack, many have argued that Article
51 permits “anticipatory” self-defense in the event of an imminent and
overwhelming threat. The Russian officials’ rhetoric does not appear to invoke the first exception, as officials have said nothing about asking the Security Council for permission to use force. If Russia asked for the Security
Council’s permission to use force against Georgia, it would be unlikely to
succeed, as the United States would probably exercise its veto power. Accordingly, it appears as if Russian officials are hearkening to the second
exception, which allows for self-defense against an imminent armed attack.
Concurrently, however, the Russians are redefining what constitutes an
armed attack against Russia. By their own words, an armed attack against
143
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Abkhazia is re-characterized as an armed attack on Russia. If the Georgian
government tries to reassert control over Abkhazia, Russian officials believe
that Russia is justified in engaging its military to protect the substantial
number of Abkhaz who hold Russian passports. This is not the rhetoric of
neutral peacekeepers.
Furthermore, the Russian practice of issuing Russian passports to
Abkhaz could create a strange situation for other countries. The European
Union has agreed to ease its visa rules for Russians, but not Georgians. Accordingly, Georgians could find it more difficult to visit the European Union than Abkhaz carrying Russian passports.149 One solution is for the European Union not to recognize Abkhazian’s Russian passports “‘as having
the same validity as those Russian passport holders who are resident in the
territory of the Russian Federation.’”150
E.

Withdrawal of Consent

Peacekeeping forces, whether or not they derive their mandate from
the Security Council, are usually established and maintained with the consent of all States concerned.151 Generally, the withdrawal of consent by a
host State terminates a peacekeeping operation.152 No particular formalities
are required for the withdrawal of consent.153 Nevertheless, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) parted from this rule with
Resolution 689 (1991) declaring, “[t]he deployment of UNIKOM ‘can only
be terminated by a decision of the [Security] Council.’”154
Initially, both Georgia and Abkhazia consented to Russia’s involvement as a peacekeeper, although there is an argument that Russia
coerced Georgia’s consent. When the July 1993 cease-fire negotiated between Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia broke down, the Russian foreign ministry pressured the sides into negotiating with one another. Regardless of
this, “the Russian general staff had decided that the only way to resolve the
conflict would be to remove all Georgian military forces from Abkhazia,
and the Russian military mounted a surprise attack supporting the Abkhaz
forces in taking Sukhumi and other lands.”155 At this time, President Shevardnadze “had to accept CIS membership and give permission for Russian
149
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forces to be stationed in Georgia.”156 Georgia consented to the presence of
Russian peacekeepers in the March 3, 1994 Declaration on Measures for A
Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict.157 The Declaration
states, “[t]he parties reaffirm their request for the early development of a
peacekeeping operation and for the participation of a Russian military contingent in the United Nations peacekeeping force. . . .”158 Georgia consented
to the presence of a Russian force so long as it was engaged in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, Georgia consented to a “Russian military contingent in the United Nations peacekeeping force,” suggesting that Georgia
consented to a Russian military contingent that it expected to comply with
United Nations peacekeeping norms.159 Moreover, Georgia acquiesced to a
multinational peacekeeping force, and not a force comprised solely of Russian soldiers. Accordingly, Georgia’s consent was not open-ended but was
limited by the Declaration.160
In October 2005, the Georgian Parliament issued a resolution setting deadlines for either corrective measures or termination of Russian
“peacekeeping” and “mediating” activities in Abkhazia.161 In July 2006, the
Georgian Parliament issued a resolution resolving to “entrust the Government of Georgia with a task to launch necessary procedures to immediately
suspend the so-called peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia . . . and to immediately withdraw the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the
territory of Georgia.”162
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In November 2006, weekly quadripartite meetings between Georgia, Abkhazia, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force to discuss issues
in the conflict zone were suspended following the resignation of the Georgian Coordinator.163 Georgia has not appointed a new Coordinator but rather
“expressed its reservations about the effectiveness of the existing quadripartite meeting and [] raised the issue of a possible change in its format.”164
After years of unresolved or “frozen conflict” with Abkhazia, Georgian
President Saaskashvili told the U.N. “[i]t is a well settled and universally
accepted law that Georgia has the sovereign right to request the removal of
[Russian] military forces that impede the peaceful resolution to conflict.”165
Yet, Russian peacekeepers remain in Georgia despite the Georgian Parliament’s resolutions and Saakashvili’s statements to the United Nations. In
light of the fact that there are no formal requirements for the withdrawal of
consent pursuant to international law, and there is no U.N. resolution requiring the Security Council’s decision to effect a withdrawal, Georgia can argue that Russian peacekeepers remain there in violation of international law.
V. QUESTIONING THE EFFICACY OF U.N. JOINT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
Russia’s violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia
conflict raise questions about the efficacy of United Nations joint peacekeeping missions. The United Nations defines peacekeeping as “a way to
help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace.”166
After the Cold War, there was “a shift toward the acceptance of collective
intervention for humanitarian purposes in internal conflicts.”167 The U.N.
Charter authorizes the Security Council to take collective action to maintain
international peace and security by authorizing peacekeeping operations.168
Article 52(1) states:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action if such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
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Whether such regional action requires Security Council approval is the subject of great debate.169 Article 53(1) states, “[n]o enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.” However, it is arguable that Article
52(1) allows regional interventions not authorized by the Security Council
so long as they are consistent with “the Purposes and Principles of the
[United Nations].”170 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of unauthorized interventions is often called into question.171
Where direct U.N. involvement is not considered appropriate or
feasible, the Security Council may give its authorization to regional or other
international organizations or “coalitions of willing countries” to implement
certain peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions. Such cooperative
arrangements are desirable in that they allow the United Nations to share the
diplomatic and economic burden of peacekeeping with other entities.172
Regional peacekeeping arrangements, however, are not without their drawbacks.173 In 1994, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali recognized
some of the dangers of regional peacekeeping. He said that regional peacekeeping involves problems of (1) command and coordination, (2) simultaneously fielding successful multiple operations by multiple actors, (3) the
changing nature of conflict, and (4) the “new regionalism.”174 While recognizing the possibility for regional peacekeepers to “enhance the effectiveness” of U.N. peacekeeping capacities, Boutros-Gali warned that regional
involvement might also carry with it certain dangers, as “[t]hose close to a
problem and well equipped to handle it may also be too close to its living
historical associations: in short, regional involvement may raise the old
fears of regional hegemony and intervention.”175 These problems plagued
the joint peacekeeping initiative of the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia
169
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(UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which began in
1993.176 These same problems plague the joint peacekeeping initiative of
the UNOMIG and CIS, where Russia’s involvement in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict is relatively unchecked by the United Nations and has
resulted in numerous violations of international law.
Without an effective framework for joint peacekeeping missions,
the United Nations entered into a relationship with Russia whereby Russia
was privy to U.N. monies, but also able to focus on its own interests, and
arguably, perpetuate and prolong the conflict. As mentioned previously, the
UNOMIG and CIS mandates are parallel but independent. Furthermore,
Russia has been in the lead on issues related to UNOMIG for the duration of
its operation.177 In fact, Russian peacekeepers violated international law by
providing weapons and engaging in military action against Georgia and
murdering Georgian civilians. Additionally, Russia engaged in practices,
such as the preferential distribution of passports to Abkhaz, in contravention
of the expectation that peacekeepers are neutral; these and other Russian
actions raise significant questions of international law. Finally, Georgia
effectively withdrew its consent to Russian peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the
joint peacekeeping endeavor continues, and some members of the Security
Council have only recently begun to raise questions about the wisdom of
allowing Russia to continue in its peacekeeping role.178
VI. GEORGIA’S POSSIBLE RECOURSE
Georgia has several options for action against Russia. Georgia can
“communicate” with the International Criminal Court (ICC), request that
the Security Council refer its case to the ICC, request that the Security
Council authorize the creation of an ad hoc war crimes tribunal, or create its
own national tribunal to try those accused of war crimes, etc. Yet, it is unclear which action, if any, would be successful.
While the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over Russian war
crimes,179 its jurisdiction is limited to events taking place after July 1,
2002.180 The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes “in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission
of such crimes.”181 The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes that took place
176
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within the territory of member States, and where the nationals of Member
states commit crimes no matter where the crime is committed.
In March 2003, Paata Davitaia, the former Minister of Justice in
Abkhazia (pro-Georgian), submitted a “communication” to the ICC alleging
that the Abkhazian government administered a regime of ethnic cleansing
against ethnic Georgians.182 Because of the great Russian involvement in
the conflict, it is likely that Russia and individual Russians were also implicated in the communication. Davitaia, however, communicated with the
ICC as an ordinary citizen, not on behalf of the Georgian government. Upon
receipt of the communication, the Prosecutor was required to “analyze the
information to determine whether there was a basis to launch an investigation.”183 The Prosecutor’s office is unable to initiate an investigation unless
it concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed184 and it obtains the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization. In August 2004, the Prosecutor’s office
stated that it had not decided to investigate the alleged crimes committed in
Abkhazia and pointed out that the ICC “is a tool of last instance that may
act only when states are unwilling or unable to investigate crimes.”185 The
Prosecutor appeared to require exhaustion of domestic remedies. Nevertheless, this refusal does not entirely close the matter; the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation based on the presentation of new facts or information.186
Georgia, itself a party to the ICC,187 may consider complaining
against Abkhazia and Russia in the ICC. In deciding whether to investigate
Georgia’s communication, the Prosecutor’s analysis will be similar to the
analysis of Davitaia’s communication. Georgia’s communication may,
however, carry greater weight as:
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Where the Prosecutor receives a referral from the State in which a crime
has been committed, the Prosecutor has the advantage of knowing that that
State has the political will to provide his Office with all the cooperation
within the country that it is required to give under the Statute. Because the
State, of its own volition, has requested the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor can be confident that the national authorities will
assist the investigation, will accord the privileges and immunities necessary for the investigation, and will be anxious to provide if possible and
appropriate the necessary level of protection to investigators and witnesses.188

There are reports that Georgia has, in fact, communicated with the ICC.
Such a communication would need to include sufficient documentation of
Russian war crimes in order for the Prosecutor to pursue a case against Russia. Yet, the Prosecutor’s response to such communications is a matter of
speculation at this time. The Prosecutor may again require the exhaustion of
domestic remedies. Furthermore, Abkhaz officials say that if Georgia has
communicated with the ICC, Abkhazia should have the right to communicate with the ICC, a right it would otherwise not have because of its status
as an unrecognized state.189 Accordingly, if Georgia has not communicated
with the ICC, it may hesitate to do so if the ICC will investigate Abkhazian
claims against Georgians and the Georgian government. Whether or not
Georgia has officially communicated with the ICC, the Georgian government should continue to collect information and evidence documenting Abkhazian and Russian crimes.
A third option is for Georgia to request that the Security Council refer the situation to the ICC. This is unlikely to occur as Russia holds one of
the five permanent seats on the Security Council and has veto power. Russia
is likely to veto a resolution referring the conflict to the ICC because it
opens up the possibility that the Russian government, and Russian citizens
engaged in the conflict, might be held criminally liable for their actions.
In the alternative, Georgia could request the formation of an ad hoc
war crimes tribunal. Yet, the formation of an ad hoc tribunal requires Security Council authorization. Once again, it is unlikely that the Security Council would authorize the creation of an ad hoc tribunal as Russia holds one of
the five permanent seats on the Security Council and the attendant veto
power. While the Security Council acknowledged complaints that certain
188
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hostilities in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict amounted to ethnic cleansing
and genocide and urged the formation of a joint investigation group,190 the
Security Council resolution did not name Russia as an offender. Certainly,
Russia would have exercised its veto power to prevent being named in conjunction with accusations of ethnic cleansing and genocide. It is unclear
whether a joint investigation group was, in fact, formed. Accordingly, the
Security Council should authorize a group to investigate all accusations of
ethnic cleansing, including those against Russian peacekeepers and other
Russian nationals. It is likely, however, that Russia will veto any such resolution. If that is the case, Georgia can seek a General Assembly resolution
calling for the creation of an ad hoc war crimes tribunal. Unfortunately,
such a resolution would be non-binding and purely symbolic.
A final option is for Georgia to establish its own domestic tribunal
in which to try those accused of war crimes. Such a tribunal, however,
would likely face a great deal of criticism and create even more problems in
Georgia, as Georgia’s legal system is notoriously corrupt and inept.191
Moreover, Georgia should not expect much help from the Abkhaz in investigating or prosecuting any suspected war criminals. Accordingly, Georgia
has little in the way of meaningful recourse available against Russia’s violations of international law.
It appears that resolution of this issue rests with the Russians. Russia should promote justice by conducting investigations into complaints that
certain actions of Russian citizens in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict have
amounted to ethnic cleansing and try offenders in Russian courts. While this
does not address the issue of the Russian government’s violations of international law, it might go a long way in healing the wounds of some of those
injured in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict. This, however, does not seem
likely as Russia/Georgia tensions continue as they have for many years.192
VII. CONCLUSIONS
While the CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is U.N.-sanctioned,
Russian forces have violated international law, which undermines Russia’s
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credibility as a peacekeeper in Georgia. Furthermore, the Russian government has engaged in practices such as the preferential distribution of passports to those of Abkhaz ethnicity, which seemingly undermines Russia’s
alleged position of neutrality. The Georgia/Abkhazia conflict has dragged
on for nearly sixteen years, without conditions suitable for the sizeable return of internally displaced persons to their homes or for a peaceful political
settlement. While it is possible that Uzbek peacekeepers will replace the
Russian peacekeepers,193 Russia should commit not to take unilateral measures.
The future of U.N. peacekeeping as a whole appears to lie with regional organizations.194 While the United Nations values its peacekeeping
partnerships with regional organizations (e.g., NATO, the European Union,
the African Union, etc.), the partnership created between the United Nations
and Russia in response to the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict has been unsuccessful. The lack of success in this and other U.N. joint peacekeeping endeavors raises doubts about the efficacy of the current framework for U.N.
joint peacekeeping.
With “the potential for some 200 inter-ethnic conflicts as well as
other conflicts in the former communist lands,” 195 the United Nations
should develop a framework for joint peacekeeping missions with Russia, as
the probability that Russia will engage in U.N. joint peacekeeping in the
region is almost certain. The United Nations should begin to work with
Russia now to ensure that when a new conflict arises, there is an existing
framework allowing the partnership to quickly enter the region and effectively work towards peace. Such a framework or agreement would require
Russia to adhere to U.N. peacekeeping norms, provide for Russian accountability to the United Nations, and ensure that future joint peacekeeping
operations actually result in peacekeeping as opposed to blatant violations
of international law.
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